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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
C & A DEVELOPMENT CO., an
Arizona corporation and C & A
ENTERPRISES, an Arizona
partnership,
Appellants,

NO.

20676

vs.
WORTHINGTON & KIMBALL CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a Utah general partnership,
GARY WORTHINGTON and EDWIN N. KIMBALL,
general partners,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
and
OTTO BUEHNER & CO.,
Defendant and Appellee.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action arising out of construction of a
manufacturing plant.

Plaintiffs seek confirmation of an

arbitration award and enforcement of a mechanics lien.
Defendant, Otto Buehner & Company, seeks enforcement of its
mechanics lien and damages in contract against Plaintiffs.
Defendant, Joseph Smith Plumbing, seeks damages in contract
against Plaintiffs.

Defendants, C & A Enterprises and C & A

Development Co. seek vacation of the arbitration award and
Defendant, C & A Enterprises, seeks damages from Defendant, Otto
Buehner & Company, for its negligence.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The arbitration award was confirmed on Plaintiffs'
Motion.

The District Court held that the cross-claim of C & A

Enterprises against Otto Buehner & Company was barred by
collateral estoppel.

The mechanics lien of Otto Buehner & Company

was granted but the lien of Plaintiffs was denied.

Joseph Smith

Plumbing was awarded damages in contract against Plaintiffs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants herein seek reversal of the judgment and
remand to the District Court with instructions to vacate the
arbitration award and to permit Appellant, C & A Enterprises, to
pursue its cross-claim against Otto Buehner & Company.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 12, 1984, the District Court for Weber County
confirmed an arbitration award in favor of Appellee, Worthington &
Kimball Construction Co.

Record at pp. 160-161.

Said Appellee

had moved to confirm the award (Record at 41-43) within the time
provided by statute.

The motion had been opposed by Appellants

who also moved the court to vacate the award.

Record at 69-70.

Trial was held with respect to additional claims of the parties
which were not concluded by confirmation of the arbitration award.
The trial resulted in the Corrected Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (Record at 1116-1137) and a Corrected Order,
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (Record at 1108-1115) on April
18, 1985.

The arbitration award provided for "interest'1 to
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. (referred to as
the contractor in the award) at fifteen percent (15%) from
December 1, 1982•

Record at 48-49, paragraph 7.

The District

Court refused to enforce the fifteen percent (15%) "interest"
award made by the arbitrators because it found that that portion
of the award, while denominated by the arbitrators as "interest",
was apparently intended as a penalty.
paragraph 33.

Record at 722 and 1130,

The District Court therefore granted Appellee,

Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., interest at the rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum on their Judgment against Appellants.
Record at 1109-1110, paragraph 1.
The arbitrators had specified in the award that the
fifteen percent (15%) "interest" was in part a measure of damages
to Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. for the unreasonable
withholding of the balance of the contract price.
48-49, paragraph 7.

Record at

The District Court's determination that the

"interest" was in fact a penalty was based on the language of the
award itself.

Record.at 1227, lines 8-9.

By its terms, the arbitration award was not payable by
Appellants (referred to as the owner in the award) until Appellee,
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., filed with the American
Arbitration Association lien waivers from the contractor and all
its subcontractors.

Record at 49, paragraph 9.

The contract

between Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. and C & A

Development Co. ("Contract") specifies with respect to the date
payments are due thereunder:
11.7 No payment shall be made under Article 11
unless Contractor shall have attached to the
Application for Payment Lien Waivers, from
Contractor and Sub-Contractors, as the Owner and
Interim Lender shall require.
Record at 60. It further indicates with respect to the final
payment:
11.5 Before issuance of Final Payment, the
Contractor shall submit satisfactory evidence that
all payrolls, materials bills and other indebtedness
connected with the Project have been paid or
otherwise satisfied.
Record at 60.
Under the Contract, interest was payable on payments due
but unpaid "provided Contractor shall have timely furnished Owner
all documentation required for such payment."
paragraph 11.1.4.

Record at 60,

The arbitrators had indicated to the parties that

they believed that any award to Appellee, Worthington & Kimball
Construction Co., should be conditioned upon delivery of lien
waivers or release.

Record at 97, paragraph 8.

The District Court

did not find nor does the record reflect that lien waivers were ever
provided.

In a letter specifying issues the arbitrators wished the
parties to address in their post-hearing briefs, the arbitrators
indicated they were considering imposing a penalty.

Among the

questions they asked the parties to address were:
4.a. Did C & A withhold an unreasonable amount
on contractor's request for final payment?

b. If so, what penalty, if any, should be
assessed against C & A?
Record at 96.

With respect to arbitration, the Contract provides:
16.1 All claims, disputes and other matters in
questions arising out of or relating to this
agreement or the breach thereof, except with respect
to the Architects/Engineers decision on matters
relating to an artistic effect, and except for claims
which have been waived by the making or acceptance of
Final Payment shall be decided by arbitration in
accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association then
obtaining unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise. . . .
16.4 Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the
Contractor shall carry on the Work and maintain the
Contract Time Schedule during any arbitration
proceedings and the Owner shall continue to make
payments in accordance with this Agreement
Record at 65-66.
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules referred to in
paragraph 16.1 of the Contract provide with respect to the scope of
an award made pursuant thereto:
The arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief
which is just and equitable and within the terms of
the agreement of the parties. . . .
Record at 82, Rule 43.
The arbitrators stated in the award that the arbitration
was "to resolve disputes between the parties arising out of the
performance and interruption of a contract . . . for the design and
construction of a factory building . . . . "

Record at 44. The

arbitrators awarded Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction

Co,, "the unpaid balance of the contract price as adjusted by change
orders • . • subject to such deductions therefrom as the arbitrators
find to be warranted under the terms of the contract and the
evidence received with respect to the claims of the owner."
at 47, paragraph 4.

Record

Among the reasons stated for denial of other

claims of the owner are:
a.

Not the responsibility of the contractor;

c. Not authorized by or barred by the terms of the
contract between the parties, including the plans and
specifications;

e. Not included within the scope of work to be
performed by the contractor;. . . .
Record at 48, paragraph 6.

Among the reasons given by the

Arbitrators for denial of other claims of the contractor are:
a.

Not the responsibility of the owner;

c. Not authorized by the contract or barred by the
terms of the contract, including the plans and
specifications;
d. Already covered in change orders executed by
owner and contractor; . . . .
Record at 49, paragraph 8.
With the exception of the reference to a penalty, all of
the issues which the arbitrators requested the parties to consider
in the post-hearing briefs dealt with claims grounded in the
contract between the parties.

Record at 95-98.

Seventeen days of hearings were held in connection with
the arbitration.

Record at 44. At the close of the hearings,

counsel for Appellants and counsel for the Appellee, Worthington &
Kimball Construction Co., both indicated that they had no further
witnesses.

Record at 131, line 18 through 132, line 8.

The

arbitrators and the parties had previously agreed on dates for
submission of briefs and reply briefs, (Record at 130) and agreed
that the arbitrators would meet thereafter and declare the hearings
closed, (Record at 132, line 14-133, line 1). The hearings were
closed by the arbitrators September 2, 1983 and an award was to be
made on or before October 2, 1983.

Record at 83-84.

On August 30, 1983, after the evidence taking portion of
the hearing had concluded and the time for filing briefs had passed,
Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., moved to reopen
the hearing.

Record at 85-88.

Appellants had argued in their

arbitration reply brief that no claim had been established against
two of the respondents in the arbitration, C & A Enterprises and
C & A Companies, Inc.

Record at 85, 89-91.

In its motion to reopen the hearings, Appellee,
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., claimed assignment of the
Contract by C & A Development Co. to C & A Enterprises, but did not
cite testimony in the arbitration of any assignment or consent
thereto nor did it refer the arbitrators to an assignment of the
contract or a consent thereto which had been made an exhibit to the
arbitration.

Record at 85, numbered paragraph 1 and 2. Appellee,

Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., by its motion, supplemented

its briefs by proposing theories upon which the joint and several
liability of all the arbitration respondents could be based.

Record

at 85-88.
With respect to presentation of evidence, the Construction
Industry Arbitration Rules specified by the Contract provide in
part:
All
the
any
his

evidence shall be taken in the presence of all of
arbitrators and all of the parties, except where
of the parties is absent in default or has waived
or her right to be present.

Record at 81, Rule 31.
There is no evidence in the record of any default by Appellants or
either of them at the time the motion to reopen the hearings was
submitted nor of any waiver of the right to be present at such time.
The arbitration hearings were reopened (Record at 92) over
the objection of Appellants, (Record at 89-91).

An additional

hearing was noticed for the purpose of taking additional evidence
regarding the claims of Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction
Co., Record at 93.

Appellants objected to the hearing and to any

proceedings which permitted Appellee, Worthington & Kimball
Construction Co., to further support its claims without also
permitting Appellants to present additional evidence in support of
their claims.

Record at 94. When the hearing was held despite

their objection, Appellants stipulated that the Contract had been
assigned by Appellants, C & A Development Co., to Appellant, C & A
Enterprises.

Record at 45.

Appellee asserted in its motion to reopen the hearings
that reopening the hearings should not delay making the award.

Record at 88. No award was made as of October 2, 1983, the date
thirty days from close of the hearings set for making the award*
Record at 83-84.

The award was not made until November 7, 1983.

Record at 50.
The Contract does not fix a date by which any arbitration
award must be made thereunder.

Record at 51-66.

It does provide

that the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association apply unless the parties otherwise agree.
Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1. The record does not reflect any
other agreement by the parties regarding the time for making an
arbitration award.
The Construction Industry Arbitration Rules provide with
respect to time for making an award:
The award shall be made promptly by the arbitrator
and, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, or
specified by law, not later than thirty days from the
date of closing the hearings, or if oral hearings
have been waved, from the date of transmitting the
final statements and proofs to the arbitrator.
Record at 82, Rule 41.
There is no evidence in the record of any agreement by the
parties for extension of the time for making the award.

The

Construction Industry Arbitration rules provide:
The hearings may be reopened by the arbitrator at
will, or upon application of a party at any time
before the award is made. If the reopening of the
hearing would prevent the making of the award within
the specific time agreed upon by the parties in the
contract out of which the controversy has arisen, the
matter may not be reopened unless the parties agree
upon the extension of such time limit. When no
specific date is fixed in the contract, the
arbitrator may reopen the hearings, and the

arbitrator shall have thirty days from the closing of
the reopened hearing within which to make an award.
The District Court ruled that Appellant, C & A Enterprises
were barred by collateral estoppel from maintaining its cross-claim
(Record at 307-315) against Otto Buehner & Company for negligence.
Record at 44.

Otto Buehner & Company was not a party to the

contract or the arbitration.

Record at 711-713.

The contract

provides:
4c3 No contractual relationship shall exist between
the Owner and any Subcontractor and the Contractor
shall be responsible for the management of the
Subcontractors in the performance of their Work.
Record at 55.
The confirmation of the arbitration award (Record at
160-161) and the Order and Judgment signed by the District Court in
connection therewith (Record at 166-167) did not adjudicate all the
claims, rights or liabilities of all the parties to the action.
Retrial Order, Record at 726 et seq.

The District Court did not

make a determination that there was no just reason for delay or
direct entry of judgment confirm in the award.

Record at 166-167.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.
The District Court erred in refusing to vacate the
arbitration award although it found that the award included an
improper penalty which the court would not enforce.

II.
The District Court erred in failing to vacate the
arbitration award which was not made within the time required and
with respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the
hearing.
III.
The District Court erred in ruling that the claims of
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner &
Company are barred by collateral estoppel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The District Court erred in refusing to vacate

the award although it found that the award included an improper
penalty which the court would not enforce.
This court has recognized the public policy in favor of
arbitration.

Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d

1070 (Utah 1981).

The Court has noted that arbitration is a

practical and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing
court congestion.
(Utah 1983).

Robinson and Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844

However, the legislature has enacted statutes which

govern the arbitrability of claims, the procedure to be followed and
the court's powers and responsibilities with respect thereto.

Utah

Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1 through 78-31-22. This court
has recognized that judicial authority with respect to arbitration
is limited by statute.
p. 846.

Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, supra at

In fact, the court has stated that judicial review of

arbitration awards "should be strictly limited to statutory grounds
and procedures for review." Id.

Clearly, the function of the court

is to consider the award and the arbitration in accordance with the
statutes.
When the District Court found that the arbitration award
included an improper penalty, it should have vacated the award
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16 rather than
confirming the award but refusing to grant a judgment which enforced
the offending provision.
The District Court found that the award on its face
included a penalty.

Record at 1227, lines 8-9.

The award which by

its terms was not yet payable included "interest" as a measure of
damages for unreasonable withholding of the balance of contract
price.
claims.

Punitive damages are not appropriate damages for contract
Highland Construction Company v. Union Pacific Railroad

Company, 683 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1984), Jorgensen v. John Clay and
Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah 1983).
As indicated in the award, the arbitrators perceived their
responsibility was to resolve disputes arising out of the
performance and interpretation of the contract.

Except for the

"interest" found by the District Court to be a penalty, the award
clearly evaluates the claims and defenses of the parties based upon
the Contract.

The amount of the award is the amount due under the

Contract as adjusted by change orders and reduced by the contractual
claims of Appellants.

Many of the other claims of Appellants and of

the Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., were disposed

of by the arbitrators by reference to the terms of the Contract
between them.

Clearly, the arbitrable claims were those sounding in

contract.
Even if the court looked beyond the four corners of the
arbitration award, it would have properly concluded that only
contractual damages were to be included in the award.

The rules

agreed upon by the contracting parties provided that the scope of
award was limited to remedies and relief "within the terms of the
agreement of the parties11.

Record at 82, Rule 43.

There is no

provision in the Contract for assessment of any penalty from a
party.
There was sufficient evidence beyond the face of the award
to support the District Court's finding that the "interest" which
the arbitrators awarded was not intended to compensate the
Contractor but was intended as a penalty.

No interest was payable

by the terms of the Contract until all documentation required for
payment was furnished to the Owner.

Among the documentation

required was lien waivers from the contractor and subcontractors.
Payments were not due until these documents had been provided.

The

final payment was not due until satisfactory evidence that all
payrolls, material bills and other indebtedness connected with the
project had been paid or otherwise satisfied.

The arbitrators

recognixed the contractual requirement of supplying these documents
prior to payment and provided in the award that the award was not
payable and would not be until lien waivers were provided.

There is

no evidence in the record that the required lien waivers were ever

obtained or provided, nor that other evidence that payrolls,
materials bills and other indebtedness connected with the project
had been paid or satisfied was supplied.

The arbitrators had

indicated to the parties that they felt that any award to Appellee,
Worthington & Kimball Construction Co. should be conditioned upon
delivery of lien waivers or release of liens.
Since lien waivers had not been provided, the final
payment was not due; no interest was accruing thereon under the
Contract.

Thus, the withholding of the final payment was not

wrongful or malicious and would not have supported a claim grounded
in tort for which punitive or exemplary damages could be awarded had
the claim been brought in a judicial forum rather than in
arbitration.

Jorgensen v. John Clay and Company, 660 P.2d 229 (Utah

1983).
Since the "interest" awarded was not intended as
compensatory damages but was a measure of damages for "unreasonable
withholding", it was punitive.

Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital,

Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983).

However, in a private

proceeding such as an arbitration, punitive damages do not serve
societal interests.

Arbitrators who are called upon to resolve

contractual disputes and make awards within the terms of the
parties' agreement derive their authority from the agreement and
statute and, absent agreement by the parties or statutory authority,
have no power to award punitive damages.

One court has even held

that an arbitration award of punitive damages violates public policy
and is improper even if the parties provided in their arbitration

agreement that punitive damages may be awarded.

Garrity v. Lyle

Stuart, Inc., 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793, 386 N.Y.S.2d 831
(1976).
Having determined that the "interest" was an improper
measure of damages and could not be enforced, the District Court
should have vacated the award.

The District Court had found that

the arbitrators had exceeded their authority.

Such a finding

requires that the award be vacated when a party to the arbitration
has properly so moved.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16.

The District Court could not modify the award pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17.

The District Court is

empowered to modify an award only upon application of a party.
such application had been made.

No

The statute does not grant the

District Court authority to modify the award on its own motion.
Without arrogating to itself powers which the legislature did not
grant, the District Court could not modify the award.
Even if a party had made application for modification or
the District Court had authority to modify the award on its own
motion, a modification excising the improper damages would not have
been appropriate.

The statute provides that Mthe order must modify

and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof."

Utah

Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-17. The District Court had
already determined that the intent of the arbitrators in awarding a
penalty was improper.
that intent.

It could not make an order giving effect to

The award could not be modified in accordance with the

statute which strictly limits the District Court's authority.

The District Court was required to either confirm or
vacate the award.

Because it found that the award included an

improper measure of damages which the court could not enforce, the
arbitration fell within the scope of Utah Code Annotated 1953,
Section 78-31-16.

The arbitrators had exceeded their authority.

The statute required the District Court to vacate the award.

Under

the statute, the Court had no authority to confirm the balance of
the award.
POINT II.

The District Court erred in failing to vacate

the arbitration award which was not made within the time required
and with respect to which the arbitrators improperly reopened the
hearing.
The award was made after the time set forth in the letter
of the American Arbitration Association for making the award had
lapsed.

There was no agreement of the parties to extend that time.

There was no waiver by Appellants of the requirement that an award
be made within the time specified.

The arbitrators derive their

authority from the partiesf agreement and statute and have no power
to make an award after the time provided in the agreement or statute
for making the award has lapsed.

General Metals Corp. v. Precision

Lodge 1600, 183 Cal. App.2d 586, 6 Cal. Rtpr. 910 (1960).
Appellee argued below that the time was extended by
reopening of the hearings.

Appellee asserted that no specific date

for making the award was fixed in the Contract and consequently, the
third sentence of Rule 36 of the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules (Record at 81) extends the time for making the award. The

language of the third sentence of Rule 36 indicates that it is not
intended to apply to agreements to arbitrate future disputes•

With

few exceptions, no specific date is set forth in any contract
relating to the submission to arbitration of potential future
disputes.

The parties to a contract have no way of knowing when a

dispute will arise, when arbitration would be demanded, or how long
a proceeding to resolve an unknown dispute could be expected to
take.

In the absence of such foreknowledge, attempting to fix a

specific date by which an award must be made is meaningless.
However, the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules are designed to
cover agreements to submit existing disputes to arbitration as well
as agreements relating to future disputes.

The third sentence of

Rule 36 is designed to control with respect to agreements to submit
existing disputes to arbitration.

The parties can, if they choose,

agree on a specific date by which the award must be made with
respect to a known, existing dispute.
With respect to agreements to submit future disputes, the
second sentence of Rule 36 controls.

That sentence provides:

If the reopening of the hearing would prevent
the making of the award within the specific time
agreed upon by the parties in the contract out of
which the controversy has arisen, the matter may not
be reopened, unless the parties agree upon the
extension of such time limit.
It is clear that either a time for the award was agreed
upon by the parties in the contract or they failed to set a time.
It is also clear that

there was no agreement to extend the time.

If the parties did agree upon a time, that time was thirty days from
the close of the hearings as indicated by Rule 41 of the

Construction Industry Arbitration Rules (Record at 82) which the
parties agreed would apply (Record at 65-66, paragraph 16.1) and by
the letter of the American Arbitration Association which stated that
an ward would be due within thirty days of the close of the hearings
(Record at 83-84).
No award was made within that time as a result of the
reopening the hearing.
the parties.

No extension of the time was agreed upon by

Therefore, reopening the hearings was improper.

The

time for making an award having lapsed, the arbitrators had no
authority to make the award.

The District Court should have vacated

the award.
If the parties failed in their agreement to set a time
within which the award must be made, the Utah Statutes set a time
limit.

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8 provides:
Award-Time for Making.- If the time within which the
award shall be made is not fixed in the arbitration
agreement, the award must be made within sixty (60)
days from the time of the appointment of the
arbitrators, and an award made after the lapse of
sixty (60) days shall have no legal effect, unless
the parties extend the time in which said award may
be made, which extension, or any ratification, shall
be in writing.
The date of appointment of the arbitrators does not appear

in the record but that appointment certainly occurred before the
first hearings were held on April 25, 1983, (Record at 44), one
hundred ninety-six (196) days before the award was made. More than
sixty (60) days elapsed after the closing of the hearings on
September 2, 1983 before the award was made.

If the parties did not set a time limit for making the
award, by statute the award, made more than sixty days from
appointment of the arbitrators, has no legal effect.

It should have

been vacated by the District Court.
Whether (1)

the parties agreed upon a time for making the

award and the rule applied or (2)

the statute applied because they

had failed to so agree, no award was made within the time required.
No extension of time was agreed upon.

The arbitrators had no power

to make an award after the required time.
in making the award.

They exceeded their power

The award has no legal effect and pursuant to

Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-16, it must be vacated.
The doctrine of waiver does not justify confirming an
untimely award.

There is no evidence in the record of any waiver by

Appellants of their rights.

They did not acquiesce to any

proceedings after the time set forth in the letter of the American
Arbitration Association for making the award.

They objected to

reopening the hearings, to submission of additional evidence and
argument of new theories for recovery by Appellee, Worthington &
Kimball Construction Co., after the taking of evidence had concluded
and agreed upon briefs had been submitted, and objected to
additional proceedings.
Both the statute regarding time for making the award and
the rule regarding reopening of the hearing require an affirmative
act by both parties to extend the time.

Refusal or failure by

Appellants to make such an affirmative act does not constitute a
waiver.

Nor does it evidence an intent to waive.

Rather, it

evidences the unwillingness of Appellants to agree to extend the
time.
The Connecticut Supreme Court, interpreting a statute
similar to Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-8, held that
because written agreement is required to extend the time for making
the award, waiver is precluded by the statute.

Marsala v. Valve

Corporation of America, 157 Conn. 362, 254 A.2d 469 (1969).

There

was in that case no waiver despite participation in and failure to
object to proceedings after the time fixed by the statute had
lapsed.
While public policy favors resolving disputes by
arbitration, the arbitration must conform to the agreement of the
parties.

Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co.,636 P.2d 1070

(Utah 1981).

The Court cannot ignore the requirement of the statute

or of the rule which the parties agreed would control, one of which
must apply.

Nor should the Court construe the statute or rule to

require a party to take some action to avoid waiver of a time limit
when both the statute and rule specify that the time limit applies
unless there is an express agreement to the contrary.
The finding of a waiver would not do justice to the
parties.

Appellants were not responsible for the delay in making

the award.

They argued in their arbitration reply brief that

Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co*, had not
established a claim against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A
Companies, Inc., another respondent in the arbitration.

It was not

Appellants burden at any time during the arbitration proceedings to

remind Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that it
would be necessary to establish a case against each arbitration
respondent which it desired to be bound by an award.

Appellants did

not raise a new issue by arguing the failure to establish a claim.
The issue existed from the moment Appellee, Worthington & Kimball
Construction Co., named those parties as respondents in the
arbitration.

Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., in

its motion to reopen the hearings, argued new theories for recovery
and facts not then in evidence.

All this occurred after it had

concluded its case and stated it had no further witnesses and after
the time agreed upon by the parties and directed by the arbitrators
for all briefs to be filed had passed.

If there was any waiver,

Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., waived its right
to prove a case against Appellant, C & A Enterprises and C & A
Companies, Inc. in the arbitration proceeding by waiting until the
hearings were to close to prove its claims against such parties.
No award was made within the time established by statute
or agreed upon rules, whichever applies.

There was no agreement to

extend the time for making the award as required under the statute
or rules.

Rather, Appellants objected to reopening of the hearings,

and to additional proceedings which were held.

There is no basis

for finding that Appellants waived their rights to insist upon an
award within the required time.

Instead, if there was a waiver, it

was Appellee, Worthington & Kimball Construction Co., that waived
its right to prove claims it omitted until after all evidence and
briefs had been submitted.

Any award made by the arbitrators was

made after the time for making the award had passed.

The

arbitrators had no power after the time had lapsed and thus exceeded
their powers.

The District Court should have vacated the award.

POINT III.

The District Court erred in ruling that the

claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto
Buehner & Company, are barred by collateral estoppel.
This Court has discussed the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in International Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515 (Utah
1979).

In that case, the Court stated that in order for collateral

estoppel to apply, there must be (1) a final judgment on the merits
and (2) an actual determination of the issues.

Neither of the two

requirements is met in this case.
The only judgment which existed upon which collateral
estoppel could be based was the Order and Judgment which confirmed
the arbitration award.

However, that judgment issued in this same

case was not a final judgment.

Under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure, an order, however denominated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the issues or the rights and liabilities if fewer
than all the parties is not final unless the court makes a
determination that there is no just reason for delay and directs
entry of judgment.

More than one claim for relief had been

presented in this case.

Multiple parties were involved.

The

judgment confirming the arbitration award did not adjudicate all the
claims presented nor did it adjudicate the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.

The claims remaining to be decided are described

in the pretrial order.

While it might have done so under Rule 54(b) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the District Court did not determine that
there was no just reason for delay or direct entry of judgment.

As

a result, the judgment was "subject to revision at any time before
the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties", Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
54(b).

The order was in fact modified by the District Court as it

refused to give effect in the Corrected Order, Judgment and Decree
of Foreclosure to the fifteen percent (15%) "interest" provided in
the arbitration award.
Since there was no final judgment, collateral estoppel
could not bar Appellants1 claims against Appellee, Otto Buehner &
Co.
There was not an actual determination of the issues raised
by the crossclaim of C & A Enterprises.

The arbitration award is

binding only to persons who are parties to the arbitration and only
as to subject matter submitted to the arbitrators.

Patrick J.

Ruane, Inc. v. Parker, 185 Cal.App.2d 488, 8 Cal.Rptr. 379 (1960);
Geo. V. Nolte & Co. v. Pieler Construction Co., 337 P.2d 710 (Wash*
1959);

Hosek MFG-Overland Foundry Co. v. Teats, 110 P.2d 976 (Colo.

1941).
Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, was not a party to the
arbitration.

It was not a party to the contract which was the

subject of the arbitration.

There was no agreement between

Appellant, C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Co. to
arbitrate claims existing between them.

While public policy favors

arbitration, the Court has recognized that a person cannot be
compelled to arbitrate claims which he has not agreed to arbitrate.
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-31-1;
Construction Co., supra.

Lindon City v. Engineers

Similarly, arbitrators cannot make binding

decisions regarding matters not submitted to them.

Even if the

award purported to resolve claims between Appellant,
C & A Enterprises, and Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, it would to
that extent be ineffective.
The claims of C & A Enterprises against Otto Buehner &
Company were claims based on negligence.

The arbitrators only

considered the contractual claims of the parties to the Contract.
They did not consider common law claims for negligence arising out
of the work performed by Appellee, Otto Buehner & Company, or its
failure to exercise due care in connection therewith.
There was no final judgment which actually determined the
claims of Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto
Buehner & Company.
apply.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not

The District Court erred in refusing to permit C & A

Enterprises to prove such claims.

CONCLUSION
The arbitration award should have been vacated.

The

arbitrators exceeded their powers by including in the award a
measure of damages which the District Court held to be improper and
which it refused to enforce.

That the

,f

interest,f was not

compensatory damages was evident from the face of the award and is

supported by evidence beyond the award itself which indicates that
actual interest was not payable under the contract and the
arbitrators intent was to impose a penalty which was not within the
parties' agreement and was not within the arbitrators1 authority.
The arbitrators further exceed their power by making an
award after the time for making an award had lapsed.

Whether the

time for making an award was set by agreement of the parties or by
statute, the award was not timely made.

Arbitrators only have power

to the extent authority is granted by an agreement of the parties or
by statute.

After the time for making the award had lapsed, the

arbitrators had no further power to make an award.
The District Court should have vacated the award.

This

court must reverse the judgment confirming the award and remand this
case to the District Court with instructions to vacate the
arbitration award.
Collateral estoppel did not apply to the claims of
Appellant, C & A Enterprises, against Appellee, Otto Buehner &
Company.

There was no final judgment which determined the issues

with respect to such claims.

Appellant, C & A Enterprises, was

improperly barred from submitting evidence to prove such claims.
The decision of the District Court that collateral estoppel applied
must be reversed and the case remanded to permit Appellant, C & A
Enterprises, to pursue its claims.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of August, 1985.

Robert F. Bentley

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, CHARMAINE STEWART, certify that I caused to be mailed
two copies of the foregoing Brief to the following parties, this 9th
day of August, 1985, postage prepaid, deposited in the United States
Mail:

Robert F. Babcock
Attorney for Plaintiff
185 South State Street
Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
LaVar E. Stark
Attorney for Stewart Title Guaranty
2485 Grant Avenue
Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Thomas A. Duffin
Attorney for Otto Buehner
311 South State Street
Suite 380
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

